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RECENT DECISIONS 

HOLMES v. PREFERRED PROPERTIES, INC. 
In Holmes v. Preferred Properties, Inc., I the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 20-325a(b) of the 
Connecticut General Statutes2 were not applicable in an employ­
ment contract suit brought by an employee-real estate salesman 
against his employer-real estate agency for a share of commissions 
paid to the agency by a seller procured by the salesman.3 The court 
reasoned that although listing contracts4 are governed exclusively by 
section 20-325a, the plaintiffs written employment contract was an 
undertaking separate and apart from the defendant's listing agree­
ment with the seller.5 Further, the court determined that compensa­
tion due from a real estate broker to his salesman-employee is not a 
"commission" within the meaning of General Statutes 20-325a.6 
The plaintiff in Holmes was an 82 year old licensed real estate 
salesman who had been in the employ of Preferred Properties from 
I. 190 Conn. 808, 462 A.2d 1057 (1983). 
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325a (1983) provides in pertinent part: 
Actions to Recover Commissions Arising out of Real Estate Transactions. 
(a) No person who is not licensed ... at the time he performed the acts or 
rendered the services for which recovery is sought, shall commence or bring any 
action in any court of this state, after October I, 1971, to recover any commis­
sion, compensation or other payment in respect of any act done or service ren­
dered by him, the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the 
provisions of this chapter. . . . 
(b) No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or 
bring any action in respect of any acts done or services rendered after October 
I, 1971, as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered 
pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts 
were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection 
any such contract or authorization shall (I) be in writing, (2) contain the names 
and addresses of all the parties thereto, (3) show the date on which such con­
tract was entered into ... , (4) contain the conditions of such contract or au­
thorization and (5) be signed by the parties thereto. 
3. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060. 
4. See infra text accompanying n.15. 
5. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1059. 
6. /d. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1059-60. 
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April 1977 to October 1978.7 Following Mr. Holmes' discharge, the 
defendant sold the land of a client whom Holmes had recruited. The 
land was sold in two separate transactions, in 1980 and 1981, for 
which the defendant received commissions of $18,000 and $5850, re­
spectively.s The defendant also received a commission on the sale of 
a new home to the same client in 1980, the exact amount of which 
was in dispute.9 Holmes filed suit in superior court seeking to re­
cover a share of the commission paid to the defendant in connection 
with these three transactions. The superior court, sitting without a 
jury, rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the 
requirements of General Statutes section 20-325a(b) were not met, in 
that the employment contract between the parties lacked the plain­
ti1fs address.1O The plaintiff appealed directly to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, II which found error in the superior court's applica­
tion of section 20-325a to the employment contract and ordered a 
new trial to consider the merits of the plainti1fs claim.12 
Section 20-325a is essentially an extension of the statute of 
frauds and is characteristic of statutes that many states have enacted 
in an attempt to regulate contract formation in the real estate indus­
try.13 Unless a contrary legislative intent is apparent, most courts 
have interpreted the reach of such statutes to be limited to employ­
ment agreements between owners of real estate and their brokers l4 
- commonly called "listing contracts."15 
In Revere Rea/ Estate v. Cerato, 16 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff-brokerage firm's right to recover commis­
sions depended, inter alia, upon whether its listing contract with the 
defendant-seller contained the items enumerated in section 20­
7. Id. at 810,462 A.2d at 1058-59. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 810 n.4, 462 A.2d at 1059 n.4. 
10. Id. at 811, 462 A.2d at 1059. 
11. Id. at 809, 462 A.2d at 1058. 
12. Id. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060. 
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (1967); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1624 
(Deering 1971); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978); MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 566.132 (West 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 240.10 (West 1957). 
14. E.g., Bush V. Mattingly, 62 Ariz. 483, 158 P.2d 665 (1945); Gorham v. Heiman, 
90 Cal. 346,27 P. 289 (1891); Clark V. Ward, 117 Ind. App. 307, 70 N.E.2d 755 (1947); 
Thompson v. Carey's Real Estate, 335 Mich. 474, 56 N.W.2d 255 (1953); Borisoff V. 
Schatten, 335 Mich. 684, 57 N.W.2d 430 (1953); Dura v. Walker, Hart and Co., 27 
N.Y.2d 346, 267 N.E.2d 83 (1971); Connerton V. Andrews, 195 Wis. 433, 218 N.W. 817 
(1928). See supra note 13 for statutes that were at issue in the above cases. 
15. See generally D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS, pp. 38-49 (1982). 
16. 186 Conn. 74, 438 A.2d 1202 (1982). 
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325a(b),17 In William Pitt, Inc. v. Taylor,IS the court declared that 
listing contracts were governed exclusively by section 20-325a and 
that a sales contract between a buyer and seller of real estate was 
beyond the scope of the statute. 19 The plaintiff in Taylor was a bro­
ker who brought action to recover a commission for procuring a 
ready, willing and able buyer.2o The court held that the defendant­
seller could not defend on the basis that he never signed the sales 
contract with the buyer because the sales contract was an undertak­
ing "separate and apart from the listing agreement," to which the 
statute applied.21 
The court in Holmes cited its decision in Taylor as implicitly 
rejecting the notion that all contracts relating to real estate must con­
form to section 20-325a.22 Applying the Taylor analysis, the Holmes 
court concluded that the employment contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant was separate and apart from the listing agreement 
between the defendant and the landowner.23 The court, however, 
did not rely solely on the Taylor rationale. It also found section 20­
325a inapplicable to the employment contract based upon the word­
ing of the statute itself. The court interpreted the word "commis­
sion" in section 20-325a as excluding compensation due from a real 
estate broker to a salesman-employee.24 Because the plaintiffs cause 
of action arose out of the employment contract, the court reasoned 
that it was not an action to recover a commission under section 20­
325a.25 
The court's interpretation of the scope of section 20-325ain 
Holmes does not reflect a literal reading of the statute, for there is 
neither any wording explicitly limiting the statute's applicability to 
listing contracts nor is there any language purporting to define "com­
mission." On the contrary, subsection (b) contains the phrase "no 
person" to describe who is precluded from bringing an action under 
the statute.26 Courts in other states with similar statutes, however, 
have generally construed such broad wording to exclude agreements 
17. Id. at 77, 438 A.2d at 1204. 
18. 186 Conn. 82,438 A.2d 1206 (1982). 

19.. Id. at 84,438 A.2d at 1208. 

20. Id. at 82-83, 438 A.2d at 1207-1208. 
21. Id. at 84, 438 A.2d at 1208. 
22. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1059. 
23. Id. 
24. /d. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1959-60. 
25. Id. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1060. 
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-325a(b) (West Supp. 1983-84), see supra note 2 
for text of the statute. 
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between brokers, or agreements between brokers and their salesmen­
employees, to share in commissions earned through their combined 
effortsP 
The Michigan Supreme Court has decided two cases involving 
an issue nearly identical to the one in Holmes. In Thompson v. Ca­
rey's Real Estate,28 the plaintiff, a real estate salesman, brought an 
action against his employer, a real estate broker, for a commission 
allegedly due him under an oral employment contract.29 The broker 
raised the statute of frauds in defense, the pertinent provisions of 
which bears close resemblance to 20-325a.30 In holding that the stat­
ute did not apply to the employment agreement, the court empha­
sized the fact that the relationship between the parties was one of 
employer-employee.3l It reasoned that since the validity of employ­
ment agreements in other contexts were not generally measured 
against the standards of the statute there was no reason, in the ab­
sence of any language to the contrary, to read into the statute a legis­
lative intent to give special treatment to employment contracts 
between brokers and their salesmen.32 The court in Thompson deter­
mined that the legislative purpose, in adopting the statute, was to 
protect real estate owners from unfounded claims by brokers for 
commission.33 In Borisojf v. Schallen,34 the Michigan Supreme 
Court, faced with the identical issue presented in Thompson, af­
firmed that decision and concluded that compensation due a real es­
tate salesman from his broker-employer was not a "commission" 
within the contemplation of the statute.35 
Unlike the Michigan court in Thompson, the Connecticut court 
in Holmes did not examine the peculiar nature of the employment 
relationship between a broker and his salesman, but nevertheless 
reached the same result as the Michigan court-that the compensa­
27. See supra notes \3 and 14. 
28. 335 Mich. 474, 56 N.W.2d 255 (1953). 
29. Id. at 475, 56 N.W.2d at 256. 
30. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 566.\32 (West 1967) provides in part: 
In the following cases specified in this section, every agreement. .. shall be 
void, unless. . . in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or 
by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, that is to say: 5. Every 
agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission for or upon the sale of 
any interest in real estate. . . 
31. Thompson, 335 Mich. at 476,56 N.W.2d at 257. 
32. Id. The employment agreements referred to were those contracts that were 
performable within one year. 
33. Id. 
34. 335 Mich. 684, 57 N.W.2d 430 (1953). 
35. /d. at 686, 57 N.W.2d at 431. 
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tion due a salesman is not a "commission" under the statute­
through a slightly different analysis.36 The Holmes court ignored the 
obvious difference in wording used in the Michigan statute. Section 
20-325a refers to ". . . any commission, compensation or other pay­
ment. .. ,"37 while the statutory provision interpreted in the Michi­
gan cases relied on by the Connecticut court only mentions 
"commissions."38 It is not unreasonable to infer that by adding the 
phrase "compensation or other payment," the Connecticut legisla­
ture did not intend to limit the scope of 20-325a to contracts involv­
ing the payment of brokerage commissions by an owner of real 
estate. 
The court in Holmes, however, failed to consider this alternative 
interpretation of 20-325a. Some courts have justified a broad appli­
cation of such statutes either by construing such wording as "every 
agreement" or "no person" literally, or by interpreting "commis7 
sion" liberally so as to encompass any compensation paid to a bro­
ker.39 The courts that have adopted this approach have typically 
argued that had the legislature intended a narrower scope for these 
special statute of frauds provisions, it would have employed the ap­
propriate limiting language.4o Although a similar argument can be 
made with respect to the language of 20-325a,41 the court in Holmes 
completely disregarded precedent representing the broader 
approach. 
36. Ho/mes, 190 Conn. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1059-60. See supra text accompany­
ing notes 21-24 and 27-31. 
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 20-325a (West Supp. 1983-84), see supra note 2 for 
text of the statute. 
38. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 566-132 (West 1967), see supra note 29 for portion 
of text of the statute. 
39. See, e.g., Cohen V. P.I. Spitz Co., 121 Ohio St. I, 166 N.E. 804 (1929) (the court 
held that the provision of the Ohio statute stating, "[n)o action shall be brought ... 
upon any agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission for or upon the sale of 
an interest in real estate ... ," was applicable to an oral agreement between brokers to 
divide commission. /d. at 4-5, 166 N.E. at 805, (quoting GEN. CODE § 8621 (repealed». 
The court asserted that the statutory wording was "clear and unambiguous,",containing 
neither limitations nor exceptions, and that to construe the statute otherwise would nul­
lify its plain purport.). Id See a/so Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311,162 N.W. 998 (1917). 
The court in Smith V. Starke held that the word "commission" implies a compensation to 
a factor or other agent for services rendered in making a sale, and concluded that the 
compensation plaintiff-broker was to receive under his oral contract with defendant-bro­
ker was a commission within the meaning of the statute. The court further determined 
that since the statute stated "every agreement for the payment of a commission," it was 
not within the power of the court to read exceptions into the statute. Id. at 314-15, 162 
N.W. at 999. 
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917). 
41. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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The Holmes court concluded its analysis by determining that 
the contract between plaintiff and defendant was not for a commis­
sion "but for a division of the fruits of their joint efforts" which come 
to them from the owner in the shape of a commission.42 In reaching 
this determination, the court in Holmes relied on Dura v. Walker, 
Hart and Co. ,43 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that 
the statute of frauds44 did not apply to an agreement between two 
finders to share in a commission.45 The New York court asserted 
that the purpose of the statute was to prevent fraudulent claims for 
commissions by business brokers and finders against employers, and 
not to prevent claims by one broker, or finder, against another.46 
The court reasoned that the plaintiff's theory of recovery was similar 
to that of a joint venture with its consequent fiduciary obligations, 
and that no writing was required for such agreements.47 What the 
parties actually contracted for, the court concluded, was not the pay­
ment of a commission, but "a division of the fruits of their joint ef­
forts" which had come to them from the owner in the shape of a 
commission.48 
The court in Holmes may have misplaced its reliance upon 
Dura for its 'joint efforts" analysis because the New York court 
based its interpretation of the scope of the New York statute49 on 
express statements of legislative intent documented in the N.Y. Law 
Revision Commission's Report. 5o The Connecticut court was unable 
to point to any comparable legislative guidance. 
The court's narrow construction of the scope of section 20-325a 
was also unsupported by the legislative history of the statute. Since 
its effective date, the Connecticut legislature has twice amended the 
language of section 20-325a and in neither instance did it attempt to 
clarify the ambiguous wording relating to the scope of the statute,51 
42. Holmes, 190 Conn. 808, 812-13,462 A.2d 1057, 1060. 
43. 27 N.Y.2d 346, 267 N.E.2d 83, 318 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1971). 
44. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978), see supra note 13 for text of 
the statute .. 
45. Dura, 27 N.Y.2d at 349, 267 N.E.2d at 84, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 291. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 351-52, 267 N.E.2d at 86, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 293. 
48. /d. 
49. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978), see supra note 13 for text of 
the statute. 
50. Dura, 27 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 267 N.E.2d at 84-85, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 291 (citing 
1949 report of N.Y. LAW REV. COMM., N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(G), 615 (1949». 
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325a (1983) (1972 P.A. 175, deleted from three places 
in the first sentence, the word "such" following the words "no," "or bring any" and 
"respect of any." 1973 P.A. 73-29 amended the first sentence of subsection (b) by in­
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despite the significant amount of litigation in other states over the 
am biguity of similar statutes. 52 
The Holmes decision is also vulnerable to attack on policy 
grounds. The evil sought to be avoided by statute of frauds provi­
sions such as 20-325a is financial harm resulting from fraud or mis­
representation by dishonest real estate brokers. This objective is 
potentially compromised by adherence to a rule which in practical 
effect condemns fraudulent practices by brokers in their transactions 
with landowner-clients, and yet permits such abuses in the context of 
broker-salesman employment relationships. A narrow construction 
of a statute which could reasonably be read as extending to broker­
salesman transactions, arguably reflects a weak or ambivalent judi­
cial and legislative concern over the extent of the problem or the 
need to enact regulatory measures to control it. Furthermore, the 
Holmes decision leaves the door open to fraudulent dealings be­
tween brokers and their salesmen which potentially creates problems 
of as great a magnitude as those created by brokers and sellers.53 
The court's ruling in Holmes, however, is not surprising in light 
of both its prior treatment of 20-325a in Ceralo and Taylor, and the 
factual similarity between Holmes and the two Michigan cases relied 
upon by the court.54 The soundness of the court's analysis in reach­
ing its result, however, is called into question for the following rea­
sons: first, the court failed to initially examine the express wording 
of section 20-325a and any relevant legislative history in attempting 
to discern how broadly the legislature intended that the statute was 
to operate; second, the court refused to point out and reconcile not 
only those cases that have held statutes similar to 20-325a applicable 
to broker-salesman employment agreements, but also the distin­
guishable facts of the cases upon which it relied;55 and finally, there 
serting "licensed under this chapter" following "no person" and by inserting "as set forth 
in subsection (a)" following "rendered after October I, 1971."). 
52. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14 and 37. 
53. See Dura v. Walker, Hart & Co., 27 N.Y.2d 346,351,267 N.E.2d 83, 85, 318 
N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (1971). 
54. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060. See supra notes 27-34 and accom­
panying text. 
55. One such factual distinction was the different wording in the MiChigan statute. 
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. In addition, every case relied upon by the 
Holmes court involved the enforceability of an oral agreement of employment, while the 
employment agreement in the present case was written. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that the defendant produced the written contract, of which the plaintiff had no rec­
ollection, during the course of the trial. This tactic leads one to wonder whether the 
defendant was attempting to preserve a possible ground for distinguishing such cases as 
Cohen v. PJ. Spitz Co., 121 Ohio St. I, 166 N.E. 804 (1929) and Smithy. Starke, 196 
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is an implicit inconsistency between the court's decision and the pub­
lic policy against fraudulent dealings by dishonest real estate 
brokers. 
Michael Auger 
Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917), discussed in note 39 supra, in the event the court 
adopted the approach advanced in those cases. 
